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How deep are the historical roots of the present? All around us, the world we 
live echoes with the footsteps of the past – from the houses we inhabit to the 
structure of the cities in which we dwell, the languages we speak and the 
religions many of us practice. Overwhelmingly, both the cultural universe and 
the built environment we inhabit was created before our time. The novelist 
William Faulkner famously observed: "The past is never dead. It's not even 
past." The notion that history can evolve in a particular direction, and not 
merely repeat itself, is relatively recent (Koselleck 2003). While cultural 
anthropologists and sociologists have long emphasized the sluggishness with 
which many important aspects of our lives change from generation to 
generation, economics has only recently become interested in the general 
stickiness of life – homo oeconomicus, as he emerges from most textbooks, has no 
past.  
 
Once economists began to look, a growing number of rigorous studies 
uncovered a startlingly wide range of phenomena with deep roots. From gender 
attitudes, trust, investments in human capital, and within-country variation in 
riches to racial prejudice, the shadows of the past seem to loom large in every 
corner of intellectual inquiry pursued by economists (Dell 2010; A Alesina, 
Giuliano, and Nunn 2013; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales 2016; Valencia Caicedo 2019). At the same time, many historians (and 
economic historians) see persistence studies as "ahistorical". Persistence papers 
now form a distinct group of scholarly papers (Cioni, Federico, and Vasta 2020). 
Like many labels that gain wider currency for a research program, it actually 
refers to a wide range of different approaches and research ideas. 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines persistence as the "continued or prolonged 
existence of something." Persistence papers typically measure some variable in 
the past, and then relate it to a later-day outcome, often in the present or recent 
past. The papers with the longest ‘range’ argue for historical dependence over 
millennia. Such long-term persistence seems surprising not least because of our 
everyday experience of massive and often rapid changes -- both in economic 
outcomes and cultural traits. Countries like South Korea or Italy were poor two 
generations ago, but rank amongst the richest today; attitudes towards 
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homosexuality, corporal punishment, smoking, women's work, and pre-marital 
sex have changed beyond all recognition in the last 40 years or so, a mere blink 
of an eye in the history of mankind. 
 
How can we understand the juxtaposition of rapid change and remarkable 
persistence over the long run? If persistence is indeed a fact, and common 
across a wide range of outcomes, the implications for economic policy – and 
even for philosophical questions such as the concept of free will – can be 
profoundly disturbing. If, for example, a country’s riches today are largely 
determined by its use of technology 1000 BC, its chances for development may 
be severely curtailed – at least as long as time travel remains a technological 
challenge.  
 
This essay's purpose is to first clarify the meaning of persistence before 
providing an overview of what insights the buoyant literature has produced in 
the last decade. I will then discuss critically the empirical and conceptual 
challenges, and propose methods and standards for assessing the plausibility of 
persistence studies. 
 
The range of historical variables used in persistence studies is wide -- from the 
self-governance of Italian city states to plough usage, medieval pogroms, and 
the adoption of Protestantism to gold discoveries, a very large number of 
different explanatory variables has been examined in persistence papers. The 
types of dependent variables used is also large, ranging from GDP per capita, 
city growth, human capital investment, and institutional quality to anti-Semitic 
violence, trust and gender attitudes. Since this chapter cannot survey every 
combination of variables that have been tried in the domain of persistence 
studies, it will aim to illustrate key themes and challenges.  
 
Conceptual Challenges 
Persistence studies arguably come in at least two and a half different “flavors”. 
Since the mechanisms underlying them are distinct, it would be misguided to 
conflate them by using the same rubric. The first “flavor” takes modern-day 
output or a related variable, and regresses it on a historical variable. Conceptual 
problems arise where the origin of the historical treatment is unclear – many 
shocks and outcomes in the past can create self-perpetuating equilibria. 
Numerous papers in this category can be classified as ‘apples-and-oranges’ 
papers – meaning that they regress outcomes (today) on historical variables that 
are quite different in nature. Many papers of this kind have economic outcomes 
on the left-hand side, and some non-economic variable on the right – not only 
arguing, in effect, that the past influences the economic presence, but that non-
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economic variables are key drivers. While some of hypothesized linkages can 
seem ad-hoc, the more promising papers in this literature use theoretical 
frameworks from pre-existing studies to discipline the empirical analysis 
(‘apples-and-oranges-with-theory’). This can help to alleviate concerns over 
extensive specification searches, with large numbers of combinations of 
variables being tried out until a significant result emerges. 
 
A second flavor of persistence study focuses on cultural characteristics such as 
attitudes and beliefs, using non-economic factors as explanatory and dependent 
variable. I will refer to these as ‘apples-on-apples’ papers, using left-and-right-
hand side variables that are conceptually close. This can seem more compelling. 
This second category of papers, while arguably easier to conceptualize, may 
suffers from possible confounders "along the way": many of the driving 
variables have direct economic effects; by influencing economic conditions in 
the past, their link with outcomes today may be intermediated by other, 
unrelated variables, creating a spaghetti-tangle of causal relationships.  
 
The “History Curse” – An Illustration 
The bible, in the book of Matthew (13:12), already had a view on the importance 
of persistence: “For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have 
more abundance; but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even 
that he hath.” The biblical idea applies to individuals. It implies not just an 
enormous predictive power of starting positions, but even increasing 
polarization over time.  
 
A first glance at long-run patterns in output per capita suggests that the 
Matthew principle broadly holds in the cross-section of countries. Figure 1 
shows a scatterplot of per capita incomes in 1500, 1700, 1820, and 1998. While the 
correlation is not perfect, correlation coefficients are high. Past riches explain 
up to 64% of modern-day riches.  While the effect of the past fades, it does so 
surprisingly slowly – per capita income in 1500 still explains 20% of the 
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Figure 1: Scatterplot of Per Capita Incomes in 1500, 1700, 1820, and 1998 
Source: Voigtländer and Voth (2013a) 
 
The strong grip of the past is startling because it is hard to rationalize in 
workhorse models of economic growth. In the Solow-Swan model, for example, 
convergence between rich and poor countries should be relatively rapid. With 
low capital, the return to savings should be high. Consequently, in poor 
countries, high savings will drive a massive expansion of the capital stock, 
which in turn should create catch-up vis-a-vis leading countries in short order. 
Most of the convergence should occur within a few decades at most (Pritchett 
1997). 
 
First of all, the Matthew effect needs to put into perspective – dramatic reversal 
can and have occurred over the course of history. China used to dominate most 
of the world in terms of the sophistication of its technology, the quality of its 
bureaucracy, and the effectiveness of its his highly centralized state. Why it 
nonetheless failed to develop economically is the subject of the so-called 
“Needham Puzzle”, which is the subject of substantial recent research interest 
(De la Croix, Doepke, and Mokyr 2018; Voigtländer and Voth 2013b; Landes 
2006; Lin 1995). Similarly, Islamic countries used to be ahead in terms of 
technology and science relative to European ones for centuries (Mokyr 1990), 
before falling behind. Sokoloff and Engerman (1997) showed how in the 
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Americas, areas that were ahead in the early days of colonization eventually fell 
behind. The sugar islands of the Caribbean are a case in point: once among the 
most prosperous places on earth, they have seen sharp declines in their relative 
economic performance (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000). Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2002) argue that among the areas colonized by Europeans, those that 
were richest in 1500 are now particularly poor as the colonizers set up 
institutions designed to exploit natural resources.1 Finally, a considerable 
number of once-poor East Asian countries have successfully escaped the 
“history curse” (Young 1995; Kim and Lau 1994; Hsieh 2002).  
 
Despite these important exceptions, the Matthew effect holds on average, as 
Figure 1 shows.  Generically, there can only be two broad classes of explanation 
for it– high incomes in the past may themselves facilitate growth, or the same 
factors that helped countries grow rich in the past are still important 
determinants of per capita income.  
 
Persistence studies overwhelmingly argue for the latter channel, but not all 
long-range results are equally plausible. In a widely-cited paper, Comin, Easterly 
and Gong (2010) ask "Was the wealth of nations determined 1000 BC?". The 
authors create indicators of technological development for different regions of 
the world, for 1000 BC, the year 0, and 1500, based on a detailed encyclopaedia 
of archaeology (for pre-historical times). These they use to explain income 
levels today. The authors find a high degree of predictability -- technologically 
advanced countries in 1000 BC, 0, or 1500 are all richer today. The finding is 
puzzling at several levels. First, because the predictive power of technology in 
1000 BC for income and technology in 0 or 1500 is limited -- why would 
technology before the age of Homer predict incomes today if it is a poor 
predictor of incomes at the time of Christ or Luther? Second, it is challenging 
to think through underlying mechanisms because the authors use geographical 
units, not populations, as units of observation. Since not many descendents of 
the people living in Germany at the time of Tacitus are still living there today, it 
is difficult to see how technology adoption by the ancient tribe called the 
Cimbri, could influence technology use in modern-day Denmark, where they 
originated. The same is true of large parts of Greece, France, Eastern Europe, to 
name but a few areas. 
  
Some of coding that drives results can be questioned. The authors, for example, 
award a point to countries building ships that cross the Atlantic, another point 
for crossing the Indian Ocean, another for the Pacific. This is, of course, not 
                                                 
1 Relatedly, Maloney and Valencia (2012) show that at the sub-national level across Latin 
America, the persistence of fortunes is the rule – but that extractive institutions (and in 
particular, slavery) reduce local persistence.  
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"technology" in the strict sense of the word -- building large, ocean-going ships 
is a technological feat. To cross various oceans with them is an outcome, driven 
by a combination of political, economic and cultural factors. Relatedly, the 1500 
coding awards a large number of points for firearms (small, large, mounted on 
large ships, etc.). These choices stack the odds in favor of finding technological 
advantages for European powers. The main puzzle pointed out by historians of 
technology over the last millennium is arguably not why China was consistently 
behind Europe in technology – but how it came to fall behind, having been 
ahead for so long (Needham 1976).  
 
One of the earliest, path-breaking studies of history’s long reach illustrates how 
challenging it is to untangle cause and effect. In their paper “Long-term 
persistence”, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2016) examine income differences 
across municipalities in modern-day Italy. They argue that the medieval 
experience of self-governance ("communes") is an important determinant of  
productivity today -- with cities that became independent creating a culture of 
civic responsibility and self-reliance that pays dividends to the present day. 
They document a persistent influence of commune status on an impressive 
range of outcomes -- from cheating on national math exams to financial 
intermediation, medieval self-governance is closely associated with desirable 
outcomes today.  
 
There are indeed strong reasons to assume that self-governance would have 
affected efficiency and output in medieval times already -- as the literature on 
the importance of institutions would predict (Figure 2). Correlated outcomes 
creating a new, self-reinforcing equilibrium, however, will often create  a good 




Figure 2: A medieval wheel of fortune – self-governance and economic success 
 
Several studies argue in favor of seemingly deep roots of comparative 
development, but base their analysis on theoretical predictions from an earlier 
literature. One important example is Putterman and Weil (2010). The authors 
begin with the well-known connection between income per capita on the one 
hand, and state antiquity time as well as time since the agricultural revolution 
on the other -- where state-like structures have existed for centuries or 
millennia, incomes are higher. The same is true for the length of time since the 
invention of sedentary agriculture in a particular country. Putterman and Weil 
make the important point that state antiquity in a location is not necessarily 
relevant -- on the territory of the modern-day United States and Canada, there 
were no state-like structures until quite recently. However, the people living in 
the US today overwhelmingly come from countries where the state is quite old. 
Some 97 percent of the population of the New World is descended from people 
whose ancestors lived elsewhere. In other places, almost no adjustment is 
necessary -- the overwhelming majority (97.5%) of Europeans are descendents of 
people who already lived in Europe in 1500.  
 
What happens if we adjust state antiquity and time since the start of agriculture 
by the effects of migration? Remarkably, their predictive power increases by 
leaps and bounds -- not state antiquity in a location matters, but the exposure 
to the existence of a state, transmitted from generation to generation. This 
points the finger at a plausible mechanism – the internalization of norms that 
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comes from abundant state power, leading to the growing “domestication” of 
humans along the lines of Pinker (2012) and Elias (1994).2 Once “rendering unto 
Caesar” has become an ingrained habit, and the state can enforce the monopoly 
of violence, it is easier for growth to occur and riches to last. In this way, the 
results by Putterman and Weil do not only add credibility to an earlier 
persistence result, but provide additional insight into factors driving 
“stickiness”.3 
 
This finding is in line with within-country evidence by Dell, Lane, and 
Querubin (2018). They show that in areas of Vietnam that were – for plausibly 
exogenous reasons – not brought under the control of the centralized Northern 
Dai Viet state, both civic society and local governance are better at creating 
public goods and redistribution. Just as in Africa (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007), 
pre-colonial centralization of state authority is systematically associated with 
better development outcomes, arguably because better governance crowds in 
pro-social attitudes and behaviors. The idea of „internalizing“ good social norms 
as a result of prolonged exposure to state power is examined more closely in a 
recent paper by Lowes et al. (2017). However, they find that among descendents 
of people who lived under the Kuba kingdom in the Central African Republic, 
honesty was no greater than amongst study participants from other areas. 
Whether this reflects the specificities of state-building under the Kuba kings, or 
the idiosyncracies of the setting (examining migrants to Kananga instead of 
locals under Kuba and alternative rule) is an open question.  
 
A similarly spectacular illustration of long-term persistence is Ashraf and 
Galor’s (2013) argument that genetic diversity – largely determined at the time 
of mankind’s migration out of Africa – is a prime determinant of riches today. 
The authors first show that migration distances from Addis Abeba are a good 
predictor of genetic diversity today. Since there is ample archaeological 
evidence to suggest that humans first appeared in Africa, and then spread in 
small groups to the rest of the world, this is a plausible argument – reinforced 
by the fact distance to other locations has no predictive power. Genetic 
variation today is greatest today in Africa, and it is lowest amongst native tribes 
of the Amazon.  
 
                                                 
2 The separate effect for agriculture is a little harder to explain. However, since the size of states 
historically increased rapidly once sedentary agriculture was invented, it may be hard to tell 
these two factors apart. 
3 An even broader interpretation of Western European divergence and technological creativity 
argues that unusually high incomes led to greater individualism, pro-social attitudes, and higher 
rates of innovation (Baumard 2019).  
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Ashraf and Galor don’t only show that genetic variation – and the part of the 
variation driven by the “out of Africa” component – predict income. They 
demonstrate that the relationship is non-linear, with intermediate levels of 
genetic diversity being best for GDP p.c. in 2000. Both too much and too little 
diversity can be bad for productivity. The argument is that ‘excessive’ ethnic 
diversity is bad because it undermines social cohesion and makes it more 
difficult for a capable state to emerge. Low levels of genetic diversity, on the 
other hand, are a barrier to creativity and technological progress. The ideal level 
of diversity follows a goldilocks logic – not too much and not too little.4  
 
Two features distinguish the Ashraf and Galor study in methodological terms. 
First, they show that their mechanism is already at work in 1500. Using 
population density as a measure of production in the Malthusian epoch, they 
find the same effects of diversity and diversity squared. The fact that the same 
pattern is visible for incomes in 1500 and 200o increases the likelihood that 
Ashraf and Galor have identified a deep parameter of the development process. 
Second, they show evidence consistent with these mechanisms: the number of 
scientific articles is higher in places with greater genetic diversity, but the level 
of interpersonal trust is lower. The value of the Ashraf and Galor study is in 
showing how one ‘deep’ parameter – genetic diversity – can lead to similar 
relative outcomes over the very long run, and in documenting plausible 
mechanisms. In other words, Ashraf and Galor’s implied explanation of the 
Matthew paradox is that the key driving variable for incomes has remained the 
same since homo sapiens left Africa some 150,000 years ago.  
 
In contrast to papers that present long-run persistence in economic outcomes 
as a black box, the Putterman-Weil and Ashraf-Galor papers have the benefit of 
documenting a detailed causal chain. Its plausibility derives from a well-
documented literature demonstrating the importance of state capacity for 
economic development (Besley and Persson 2010; 2009; Diamond 1997; Spolaore 
and Wacziarg 2009) and the deleterious effects of ethnic heterogeneity on the 
size and strength of states (Alberto Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001). 
 
Like Father, like Son 
A second category of persistence studies is arguably more humble in ambition. 
Papers with this flavor (‘apples-on-apples’) employ variables on the left- and 
right-hand side that measure the same (or very similar) traits. There is little 
doubt that persistence in the strict sense of the word exists -- with the same 
attitude or belief being passed down the generations. When the variables in 
                                                 
4 The paper has been critized by anthropologists, who contest the validity of the underlying data 
and assumptions about human behavior (Guedes et al. 2013), and declare themselves troubled by 
the potential social and political effects.   
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question are cultural features, such as attitudes and beliefs, the idea of 
persistence rests on relatively strong micro-foundations. This is what could be 
called "pure cultural persistence", especially in cases where there are no 
intervening or re-enforcing economic factors.   
 
Important work by Dohmen et al. (2012) demonstrates that fundamental 
psychological characteristics show high correlations between parents and 
children. They use data from the German socio-economic panel (SOEP), and 
examine risk taking and trust of children as a function of parental responses.  
The authors find a highly significant relationship -- even in narrowly defined 
domains, such as risk taking when driving, as opposed to risk taking in financial 
matters. The average child in Dohmen et al.’s study is 25 years old, meaning that 
results are not driven by highly impressionable young children (who may 
change their views in later life). Both mothers’ and fathers’ attitudes matter for 
trust, while others are primarily transmitted only via one of the parents. Overall 
explanatory power is not overwhelmingly high, ranging from 7 to 11 % of overall 
variation – but parents’ attitudes on average matter a great deal. Both cultural 
and genetic factors could be driving such dependence. In either case, long-term 
transmission may be higher than implied by simple correlations across two 
generations -- for example, if latent genetic factors are activated by 
circumstances, or if cultural beliefs become relevant in particular contexts. A 
similar pattern is visible in intergenerational mobility of income and socio-
economic status, where grandparents/grandchildren are more alike than is 
implied by parent-child transmission. 
 
Similarly, Fernandez and Fogli (2009) pioneered the use of data on immigrants' 
behavior, showing striking correlations of migrants’ fertility outcomes with 
fertility levels in the country of parental origin. Because the offspring of 
immigrants grew up in a very different environment than their parents, it is 
much more likely that we observe true cultural transmission and not a feedback 
effect from the environment to attitudes ("epidemiological approach"). How 
long attitudes can persist through vertical transmission is, however, not clear. 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) in “Good-bye Lenin or Not?” argue that 
Germans who grew up under the Communist regime are much more likely to 
favor redistribution and social support (and to downplay individual 
responsibility) than their countrymen who grew up in the West. The more time 
Germans spent under Communist influence, the more pro-government people 
became. Because the environment changed radically after 1989, with the fall of 
the wall, the attitudes of young people growing up in the eastern part of 
Germany today are converging towards the West German norm – but such 




The assumption that assignment to treatment in the past is often as “good as 
random” is unfortunately often wrong. Implicitly, the Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündeln paper assumes that pre-1945, East and West Germany were largely 
identical in attitudes – and hence, any differences that appear today must be the 
result of the Communist “treatment”. This assumption is prima facie sensible, 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary – after all, they had formed part of 
the same country since 1871. However, there is strong evidence that the area of 
Germany that became the GDR was already strongly different in a number of 
important dimensions prior to 1945 – church attendance was already lower, 
female labor force participation was higher, and electoral support for the 
Communists was higher in the East in the interwar period (Sascha O. Becker, 
Mergele, and Woessmann 2020). In other words, the ‘treatment’ of Communist 
rule and Soviet occupation may only have preserved or amplified pre-existing 
differences. This does not imply that there was no persistence – it implies that 
it was so strong in this particular case that even the cultural and social effects of 
a brutal, long-lasting dicatatorship did little more than to leave intact 
differences that existed long ago.  
 
Both the Dohmen et al. and the Fernandez and Fogli studies provide conceptual 
microfoundations for cultural persistence – with attitudes and beliefs staying the 
same. Along the same lines, the amplification of existing prejudice through a 
synergy with policy can strengthen beliefs and biases, as Voigtländer and Voth 
(Voigtländer and Voth 2015) show in the case of exposure to Nazi schooling and 
anti-Semitism. Historical studies that have studied such persistence over the 
long run have often focused on human capital. Here, however, the possible 
‘contamination’ with economic feedback effects is not trivial.  
 
In one recent study, Kung et al. (2020) examines the long-run effects of keju, 
China's imperial exam system. They show that areas of China where more 
citizens passed the highest level exams (jinshi), educational attainment today is 
markedly higher. The imperial exam system itself first appeared in the Han 
Dynasty (206BC-220AD). Its core elements lasted for more than two millennia. 
The authors argue that social capital, educational infrastructure, and 
interactions with political elites led to continued investments in one trait – the 
value given to education. The fact that local continuity is visible in China 
despite the massive institutional, cultural and economic discontinuity of the 
Chinese civil war and the Communist takeover after 1948 is remarkable. A 
similar result emerges from recent work on earnings differences between 
descendents of elite and non-elite families, based on social stratification prior to 
the Communist take-over. Despite the best efforts of the Chinese Communist 
party to eliminate inter-generational transmission of status and wealth, 
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descendents of China’s pre-revolutionary elite have higher education and higher 
earnings than the average Chinese (A. F. Alesina et al. 2020).5 
 
Valencia (2019) examines educational outcomes in modern-day Paraguay, Brazil, 
and Argentina. In areas inhabitated by Guaraní tribesmen, he finds that areas 
where the Jesuits proselytized, levels of education (and income) are markedly 
higher today. The Jesuits were more keenly interested in educating converts 
than other Catholic orders, building massive schools in the middle of the 
South-American rainforest. Similar effects do not exist for, say, areas of Guaraní 
settlement where the Franciscans, another order, built missions. Persistence of 
educational outcomes over 250 years is remarkable, not least because the Jesuits 
were expelled from South America, following an agreement between the 
Spanish and Portuguese crowns in 1759. In other words, just as in the Chinese 
case studied by Kung et al., Valencia finds that educational persistence is high 
over the very long run – despite the fact that in his case, the intervention 
leading to high investments in the past was itself relatively short-lived, 
compared with the prolonged Chinese exposure to a high-education 
environment in the past.  
 
Both the Valencia and the Kung et al. studies have the advantage of studying 
the same variable’s long-term evolution. At the same time, factors such as 
intellectual aptitude and the importance of education are typically partly passed 
down from parent to child within families, having both a genetic and cultural 
component – making for a plausible transmission mechanism. Along the same 
lines, Voigtländer and Voth (2012) analyze anti-Semitic attitudes and acts in 
Germany, comparing outcomes in the 1920s and 1930s with the geography of 
medieval pogroms. In these three cases, the concept being measured on the left-
hand side of the regression is essentially the same as the one that is on the 
right-hand side, or the implicit model of causation is relatively straightforward. 
Sometimes, the concept itself is not straightforward to measure ("anti-
Semitism"; "education"), requiring the use of multiple outcome indicators to 
confirm the similarity of basic patterns across time. Persistence papers in this 
vein are unlikely to suffer from the problem of multiple hypothesis testing and 
the attendant inflation of test statistics. They also - implicitly or explicitly - are 
based on a clear, micro-evidence based model of causation.  
 
A second category of papers examining the roots of attitudes and beliefs relies 
on well-specified theoretical connections between historical and modern-day 
outcomes to guide and inspire statistical analysis. Here, the link is often 
                                                 
5 This finding echoes results by Clark on the long-term transmission of status in English society 
(Clark 2014).  
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indirect, but made plausible by a pre-existing narrative or guiding theory. One 
example of this is Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013). They argue that plough 
adoption, with its need for greater upper-body strength, increased men's 
bargaining power within the household. This led to greater inequality between 
the sexes, with men being favored in terms of social status, access to food and 
education, and legal standing. The hypothesis goes back to Esther Boserup, 
whose book Women's Role in Economic Development (Boserup 2007) spelled out the 
idea that ancient agricultural practices influence gender roles today.  
 
Alesina et al. then go on to show that plough usage in pre-modern agriculture 
correlates with lower labor force participation of women today - long after the 
role of agriculture as a source of employment has declined to low levels. To 
avoid issues of omitted variable bias, the authors use data on soil suitability for 
different crop types to show that the variation in plough usage driven by 
exogenous factors predicts gender roles today. Where productive agriculture 
required men to work long and hard in the fields, it is still the case that women 
mostly stay at home today. Attitudes in the past were probably changed by a 
new tool - the plough - and then perpetuated themselves over time. The 
mechanism's plausibility could have been enhanced further by showing that 
gender roles were more unequal in historical times. If, say, in 1900 countries 
with heavy plough usage did not show much evidence of  traditional gender 
roles, and the correlation only emerged in the period after 1950, the plausibility 
of persistence as a key driver of the gender division of labor today would could 
be called into question.  
 
Similarly, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) argue that slave catching in Africa from 
the 17th to the 19th century is a cause of lower trust today.  Slave catching was 
pre-dominantly an activity that pitted Africans against Africans - few Europeans 
survived African disease environments before the 19th century. Groups that 
suffered from greater enslavement may have evolved traditions of distrusting 
outsiders, fellow tribesmen, and family, in order to avoid capture. Where slave 
catching was intense and long-lasting, this should have created a strong 
incentive for parents to pass on distrustful attitudes to children. The idea is not 
novel, but part of a long tradition of historical writings on slavery and its effects 
on African countries.  
 
The Nunn and Wantchekon study has the advantage of a setting where the 
causal connection is highly plausible, coming from a rich historical literature. At 
the same time, because of the well-known feedback effect between income and 
trust may affect each other, it is harder to think of slavery's effect on trust as 
persistence in its simplest form. If slave-catching lowered trust historically, and 
thereby also incomes in the past, thinking about causal effects becomes more 
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challenging. Since low income environments typically breed distrust (arguably 
because people do not have the resources to invest in the social connections 
maintain exchange among equals), the continued co-existence of low incomes 
and low trust in areas with massive slave hauls in the past is harder to interpret. 
Instead of showing pure cultural persistence (perhaps as a result of parent to 
child or horizontal transmission), it could be part of an equilibrium outcome, 
with two variables reinforcing each other. Here, Nunn's and Wantchekon's use 
of the epidemiological approach is crucial. By showing that Africans who 
migrated to other areas still show lower trust today if they came from areas  
historically affected by slave-catching, they can rule out much of the effect of 
contemporaneous poverty on trust. What remains is the transmission of the 
effects of both poverty and trust "back home" on an individual's attitudes.6  
 
The most questionable category of persistence papers regress a modern-day 
outcome on some variable from past, and then argues that a significant 
coefficient is a sign of persistence. This is all the more problematic if the 
explanatory variable is multi-faceted, touching on many beliefs and attitudes, 
like protestantism. Since culture travels in packages – as a set of interrelated 
characteristics – the actual insight gained by such regressions can be doubted. 
For example, a recent paper asked “Thank Martin Luther (Kenyon and Fatti 
2020)that ciprofloxacin could cure your gonorrhoea?” The paper examines the 
consumption of antimicrobial medicine in 30 European countries and shows a 
strong ‘effect’ of Protestantism – which is then rationalized by uncertainty 
avoidance and a preference for cooperation over performance in Catholic 
countries are to blame (Kenyon and Fatti 2020). Apart from the doubts one 
might reasonably have about a cross-country study with 30 observations, it is 
clear that the association with (historical) Protestantism does not create 
particular insight into the origins of resistant “super-bugs”.  
 
Mistakes and mechanisms 
For a whole class of persistence papers, there exists a readily-available 
alternative interpretation that is hard to disprove -- economic geography. This 
is because cross-sectional differences are the main source of variation exploited 
in persistence studies. As long as it cannot be supplemented by data on movers 
as in the epidemiological approach, the underlying assumption has to be that 
geography only matters for creating variation in the cross-section but not in its 
own right. For example, if geography spelled riches for some Italian cities, but 
not others in the Middle Ages, then similar factors may still be at work today. 
                                                 
6 Note that the solution is necessarily imperfect -- because we know that people's attitudes are 
more malleable at a young age. If, say, the transmission from income was strong and took place 
entirely before age 10, looking at movers only would not attenuate the reflection problem.  
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While the exact set of geographical characteristics that lead to high incomes 
may have shifted over the centuries, basic features like coastal access, centrality 
in a network of cities, and a terrain suitable for housing an expanding 
population could all influence economic performance at the same moment in 
time. Given that both economic geography and cultural traits are often highly 
persistent, good practice arguably requires a concerted effort to rule out one in 
favor of the other. 
 
Few papers explicitly try to explain (let alone model) the geographical 
distribution of their deep-rooted explanatory variable. In economic geography, 
the location of economic activity can be explained by two alternative approaches 
– either by increasing returns interacting with random shocks, as in the work 
by Krugman (1991) and Fujita (1999), or by locational fundamentals. Davis and 
Weinstein’s (2002) study of Japanese population and production after 1945 
shows that even a shock as large as the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki did not shift the distribution of economic activity significantly. This 
suggests that locational fundamentals are first-order. At the same time, 
numerous studies have found that temporary shocks can cause long-term shifts 
in economic activity. Bleakley and Lin’s (2012) study of portage sites in the US, 
Redding and Sturm’s work on Germany after 1945 – divided into two parts, with 
major consequences for economic activity – and Kline and Moretti’s (2014) 
analysis of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) all document that 
geographically well-defined local shocks can have repercussions over the long 
term. 
 
Where such well-defined shocks are not a clear source for identification, the 
claim that ‘persistence’ is to blame can be hard to substantiate. For example, 
Fritsch et al. (2019) analyze patterns of self-employment in Kaliningrad -- the 
formerly German city of Königsberg, today an exclave of the Russian 
Federation. Comparing data from 1925 and 2010, they find that patterns of self-
employment within each industry have remained broadly similar. This is 
striking because the area around Königsberg suffered heavily during the final 
phase of World War II. A high proportion of the housing stock, and of 
industrial installations, was completely destroyed. What remained of the 
original German population either fled the Soviets or was quickly expelled after 
1945. The paper then argues that in areas where small German firms adopted 
advanced technology (in the form of electric motors), the historical success of 
small firms was self-perpetuating. As the authors put it: 
 
"The most likely explanation for this persistence is the historical experience with 
entrepreneurship in a certain industry. In the case of the Kaliningrad area, this 
experience led to an awareness of the region-specific scope and viability of 
entrepreneurship among the new population. If this awareness was passed on across 
 16
generations, then it is likely to lead to a re-emergence of entrepreneurship after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, which implies high shares of small firms and self-
employment rates."  
 
The authors apparently rationalize the continued importance of self-
employment as a form of updating in the minds of the new residents -- the 
Soviet citizens looking around the ruins of Königsberg in 1945 decided, in some 
places more than in others, that in this environment, self-employment is 
promising. This insight then lay dormant for half a century, before becoming 
relevant and useful once the Soviet Union fell. The authors conclude that 
cultural transmission from Germans to Soviets is an unlikely explanatory factor, 
as new Russian residents hardly overlapped with previous German inhabitants; 
but that the awareness of entrepreneurial activity was passed down the 
generations.   
 
The effects of economic geography are a more likely interpretation. The authors 
argue that controlling for economic geography (which they proxy by coastal 
access) does not alter their results. A richer set of controls would likely capture 
more of the relevant variation. What is being produced where is often driven by 
regional specialization plus the stickiness of past infrastructure. While 
population changed entirely, existing factories and infrastructure did not. The 
Soviets repaired destroyed structures and production equipment on a 
considerable scale. The fact that industrial structures in 2010 are similar to those 
in 1925 is therefore not surprising -- not even the atomic blasts of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki had major long-term effects on the distribution of economic 
activity across space in Japan (Davis and Weinstein 2002).7 As Fritsch et al.'s 
regressions show, adding a measure of industrial structure in 1925 already 
renders historical shares of self-employment insignificant predictors of self-
employment in 2010.  
 
Some useful insight into the role of economic geography comes from an 
innovative paper by Michaels and Rauch (2018). They examine changes in the 
urban structure of Britain and France after the end of the Roman Empire. While 
Britain saw a wholesale decline of her cities after the Roman legions withdrew, 
French cities never disappeared. The "reset" of the British urban system allowed 
for the creation of new centers in favorable locations during the middle ages. In 
contrast, French cities were "locked in"; the one-off cost of moving to more 
favorable locations was never paid. This was costly in the long run. As urban 
                                                 
7 In related research, Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) demonstrate that the quality of historical 
infrastructure in Poland in the 19th century still has predictive power for modern infrastructure 
and economic prosperity. 
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centers re-emerged in medieval Europe, British cities were much more likely to 
be in places that facilitated rapid growth, with good coastal or river access.  
 
Michaels and Rauch’s paper suggests that the shadows of history can be long 
indeed, and cause major inefficiency. However, if a major shock provides an 
opportunity for a “reset”, locational fundamentals can reassert themselves, 
becoming key explanatory variables for the location of economic activity in 
space. The exact circumstances under which persistence is either strong, or 
fades away, have yet to be established.  
 
Change and re-emergence 
Persistence -- defined as the continued or prolonged existence of something -- 
also sits uncomfortably with the seeming re-emergence of historical traits and 
features. Individual human memory is not fundamentally different from that of 
other primates; but collective memory is a cultural construct: By definition, it is 
not based on the sensory experience of individuals, but an act of cultural 
production (Nora 1989). Many Israeli conscripts used to take their oath while 
serving in the IDF at Masada, where Sicarii rebels defied the Romans towards 
the end of the First Jewish-Roman war. Modern-day recruits could never have 
met anyone whose living memory included the siege, which concluded in 74 AD 
– but it nonetheless defined their country’s identity and outlook during the 
decades after 1948. Reinterpreting situations later in life through the lens of 
transmitted cultural focal points such as this one, there is 'persistence' -- but in 
the form of a latent trait or concept that can be activated when current 
cirgcumstances are reminiscent of a situation in the past (imagined, collectively 
recalled, or personally experienced). In other words, Masada acquired relevance 
for Jews living in Palestine once more when faced with the overwhelmingly 
hostile environment of the Middle East after the Jewish state’s founding.  
 
One good example of the more complex interaction of political choices and a 
remembered past is Ochsner's and Roesel's (2017) paper on the Turkish sieges 
of Vienna. Turkish advances into central Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries 
were defining moments, not just for the affected areas, but for Europe as a 
whole. As was the case with all early modern armies, the Ottoman Empire's 
invasion of the Austrian lands was accompanied by arson and plunder, rape and 
pillage. Many cities and towns commemorate the hardships of Turkish 
occupation to the present day. Heraldic crests recall how cities were burned 
down; in other locations, street names remind citizens of the horrors of the 
Turkish invasion.  
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Interestingly, towns and cities affected by the Turkish advance on Vienna were 
not more right-leaning than others during the 20th century. This changed 
radically once the far-right freedom party of Austria began to campaign against 
a potential Turkish membership of the EU in 2005. While a remote political 
prospect, the perceived threat of such a move solidified support for the FPÖ -- 
and all the more so in locations that had suffered at the hands of the Turks. 
Hence, what appears like a clear case of persistence is actually the result of 
more complex interactions; instead of suffering at the hands of one group 
leading to enmity, a long-forgotten incident is revived in public consciousness 
only if and when doing so is propitious for one political player – in this case  
“hate entrepreneurs” along the lines of Glaeser’s classic (2005) paper. The 
standard persistence analysis, a simple regression of FPÖ voting on Turkish 
occupation in 1529 and 1683, would show a high correlation -- but there is no 
direct continuity. Instead, as the authors carefully document, it was collective 
recall, carefully engineered by far-right politicians in the FPÖ, that is created an  
effect as a result of being part of an "imagined community", in the words of 
Benedikt Anderson (2006).   
 
Some insightful studies look at change and persistence jointly. Bazzi et al. 
(2017), for example, test the "Turner hypothesis" about the American frontier 
experience. Turner (1893) had famously argued that living in the newly-settled 
areas of the American West was instrumental in creating a culture of rugged 
self-dependence, and that greater scepticism about the role of the government 
compared to other countries was a direct consequence of the frontier. Bazzi et 
al. now examine one indicator of individualism -- naming patterns. They show 
that in counties on the frontier, defined as those with population density below 
a low threshold of six people per square mile, rare first names back then and 
today are much more common. In other words, naming patterns reflected a 
willingness to stand out rather than blend in. Areas that experienced the 
frontier for a long time believe that the government should not redistribute 
income, prefer public spending cuts for the poor and welfare, oppose a ban on 
assault rifles and raising the minimum wage, and prefer to reduce public debt. 
Bazzi et al. then go on to show that in these places, there is more support for 
the Republican party, and greater distrust of government intervention, than in 
parts of the US without the frontier experience.  
 
The frontier could have attracted people who were already more individualistic; 
and these could then have stayed, with their descendents still believing in the 
same values. This would be a case of direct cultural persistence. While 
transmission over a century alone would be interesting, it would not greatly 
shift priors relative to other papers. Importantly, Bazzi et al. also show that the 
frontier experience itself made people more individualistic – families that 
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moved to the frontier increasingly gave highly unusual names to their children, 
and stopped using the names of fathers and mothers to name their children. 
Children whose parents moved to the frontier when they were young were 
much more likely to be highly individualistic in naming their children, too. 
Interestingly, they also find that individualists (based on their measure) did 
better economically in 19th century America – on the frontier. It is the 
combination of documenting cultural change, selection, and persistence that 
makes the Bazzi et al. paper a particularly compelling contribution, offering 




Recently, both the size and significance of statistical persistence results have 
come to be questioned. We first discuss general challenges before turning to 
recent work on persistence and spatial autocorrelation, and the effect of long-
term dependence on parameter estimates.  
 
Potential econometric problems in persistence studies abound. Some of them 
are compounded by publication bias. Few papers estimate precisely estimated 
zero effects - in contexts where persistence might have been plausible -- or 
show that some seemingly immutable characteristics disappear. There are many 
historical events and features that could be investigated, and their effect on 
modern-day outcomes examined. Take, for example, the role of women in 
society today, and the geography of witch-hunting. Every argument made for 
why anti-Semitism might persist over long time periods could apply here; areas 
with more witch persecution will have had more negative views of women, on 
average, but will also have induced women to be less assertive, less insistent on 
equal rights, and less inclined to question traditional gender roles. Some of 
these mechanisms may have perpetuated themselves even without actual witch 
persecutions (the last of which still occurred in the 19th century). At the level of 
entire countries, the argument may have some empirical support -- the country 
with the most intense persecution of witches, Germany, has remarkably low 
rates of labor force participation, for example. In other words, there are strong 
reasons to argue that gender attitudes today should reflect witch-hunting -- but 
there are no papers making this point. Given the importance of the topic, this 
may well indicate that the link cannot be proven -- and yet, in surveys of 
persistence, non-results hardly play any role.  
 
The very range of different variables and analytical categories employed creates 
the potential for false positives. If there are N different historical variables 
whose impact might be explored, and M modern-day outcomes that can be 
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analysed, researchers could theoretically run N * M regressions). At standard 
levels of statistical significance, 0.1*(N*M) or 0.05*(N*M) regressions will find an 
effect that is different from zero. Of course, there are standard ways to adjust 
for multiple hypothesis testing, such as Bonferroni corrections. One problem is 
that for any one paper, it is hard to assess what the set of plausible variables is.. 
Researchers will typically iterate over different variables, looking for significant 
patterns. Once a pattern emerges, it becomes easier to think of a set of 
explanations why historical variable x is related to modern-day outcome y.  
 
One simple way to address the multiple hypothesis testing problem would be to 
pre-register empirical analyses, as is common in development economics. 
Researchers would have to state ex ante which patterns in the data they expect, 
and why. They could even register the range of additional variables they expect 
to try, should the main hypothesized relationship not materialize. Researchers 
might start with the hypothesis that gold discoveries in an area lead to higher 
discount rates today, because gold mining rewards immediate effort and attracts 
the impatient. If this regression turned out to be insignificant, but the 
researchers had moved on to demonstrate that there were larger gay 
communities in areas of great mineral wealth of any kind (rationalized by the 
after-effects of a sizeable gender imbalance), it would become immediately 
apparent that authors were fishing for significance.8 Because the number of 
possible explanatory/dependent variables is specified ex ante, the appropriate 
adjustment could be applied, raising the bar for statistical significance.  
 
The vast majority of persistence papers use geographical variation of a variable 
at some point in the distant past to explain a later – often modern-day – 
outcome. In a paper that has attracted substantial attention, Kelly (2019) argues 
that these papers severely understate the size of standard errors because of 
spatial correlation -- adjacent observations are not truly independent from each 
other, but display a great deal of dependence. Kelly examines the extent of 
spatial correlation analyzing the residuals of the key regressions in 23 papers, 
using Moran's I. He finds a significant degree of spatial dependence, which he 
takes to imply that significance levels have been severely overstated. To assess 
the extent of the problem, Kelly then uses spatial noise as both dependent and 
independent variable. Regressions using both produce levels of significance that 
in many cases exceed those for the main regression in the papers in question. 
While a few papers still show significance at standard levels, the vast majority 
do not. 
 
                                                 
8 After this section was written, I was made aware of a recent paper by Brodeur and Haddad 
(2018). In no way to I wish to imply that the authors followed this path of discovery – this is an 
illustrative example only.  
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None of Kelly's analysis is specific to persistence studies as such - any paper 
using spatial variation will potentially suffer from the same problem.9 The 
potential problem of spatial correlation is also widely known, and subject of a 
large literature in econometrics that has developed a standard set of tools to 
deal with it. There appear to be no compelling reasons to cast aside the 
standard econometricians’ toolbox for dealing with spatial error correlations. 
Equally importantly, there are strong reasons to reject the conclusions drawn by 
Kelly (2019). Several aspects of his implementation bias results in favor of 
finding overstated significance levels. First, where authors used a range of 
variables to capture outcomes, he invariably picks the one that makes results 
look more fragile. One example is the paper by Voigtländer and Voth (2012) 
about the link between medieval pogroms and anti-Jewish persecution in 
Germany. Kelly picks only one of the five different dependent variables used by 
the authors -- a regression with the percentage of Nazi votes in 1928 on the left-
hand side. The paper uses another four additional outcomes that also measure 
interwar anti-Semitism -- anti-Jewish pogroms before 1933, the share of Jews 
deported, letters to the anti-Semitic newspaper Der Stürmer, and attacks during 
the Night of Broken Crystal in 1938. For each of these, results even in the 
baseline specification are markedly stronger when using the Kelly method. As 
Figure 5 (below) shows, for the example of synagogue attacks, using the Kelly 
method of simulated spatial noise yields only a 2% probability of noise 
outperforming.  
 
Equally problematic is the fact that Kelly only picks the first specification 
presented in each paper. While this allows a certain degree of standardization, it 
creates a false impression of fragility -- the first regression in empirical papers 
typically shows only a simple bivariate relationship, demonstrating the strength 
of basic patterns. Papers that do not show such a basic relationship, but instead 
rely on saturated specifications to find significant coefficients, are often on 
shaky empirical grounds – but according to Kelly’s analysis, they will appear 
superior. All papers on Kelly's list as a matter of course conduct more 
sophisticated analysis using more extensive specifications. This matters 
because, if other explanatory variables capture a significant share of the spatial 
correlation, the error term itself may be largely free of spatially correlated noise.  
 
                                                 
9 Note that Kelly implicitly acknowledges as much, applying a related approach to non-historical 
papers (Kelly 2020).  
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Figure 3: Simulated regression coefficients, education regressed on 
Protestantism, baseline regression and saturated specification, Kelly (2019 
method) 
 
Almost all of the papers in question also consider the possibility of spatially 
correlated variables directly. Standard remedies like regional fixed effects and 
clustered standard errors are common in many research papers on persistence. I 
will next illustrate the strength of the bias introduced by Kelly's focus on the 
first specification in each paper. Becker and Woessmann (2009) argue that early 
adoption of Lutheranism led to higher levels in education in 19th century 
Prussia. In other words, while Max Weber's famous hypothesis about the 
economic benefits of Protestantism looks right in the cross-section, the reasons 
for it may well be different -- since Protestants put particular emphasis on 
reading the bible, human capital was simply higher. In Kelly's exercise, spatial 
noise (used as an explanatory variable) outperforms the basic regression by 
Becker and Woessmann 56 percent of the time. This, taken at face value, would 
suggest that there is no explanatory power at all in their explanatory variable – 
the share of Protestants in a Prussian county. Of course, Becker and 
Woessmann estimate full specifications including latitude and longitude, an 
interaction of latitude and longitude to control for non-linearities, plus distance 
to Berlin (Table 2, col 3), to which they add 35 district dummies (col 4). In the 
saturated specification, their coefficient on percentage Protestant improves 
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from 0.08 to 0.11, and the t-statistic from 5.15 to 10. Whatever overall similarity 
there may be in each district in terms of the share of Protestants is hence 
absorbed by the fixed effect. Put another way, when the authors effectively 
compare two counties in the same district with different shares of Protestants, 
holding constant latitude, longitude, latitude x longitude, and distance to Berlin, 
they find even larger effects. At the same time as their coefficient strengthens, 
the R2 increases from 0.057 to 0.81, moving from the basic OLS to the saturated 
specification. In the spirit of Altonji et al./Oster, this implies that unobservables 
are unlikely to account for the main finding (Oster 2017; Altonji, Elder, and 
Taber 2005).  
 
Once we re-estimate the Kelly approach with the full specification, including 
Becker and Woessmann's controls and fixed effects, noise only outperforms in 
one percent of simulations. The seeming problem of spatial correlation is well-
addressed by what the authors of the original paper already did. Fig. 3 gives an 
overview of the significance of the share of simulations outperforming the 
paper's estimated coefficient. The distribution of simulated coefficients shrinks 
as controls and fixed effects are added. Since the coefficient estimated by 
Becker and Woessmann barely changes, its significance relative to the 
distribution of simulated coefficients increases sharply. This means that the 
overall conclusion in Becker and Woessmann is robust even when using Kelly's 
method to assess significance.  
 
Figure 4 illustrates why including geographical fixed effects is a very effective 
tool to control for spatial correlation. It uses variation in Nazi voting in interwar 
Germany in 1928, and tries to explain it by the density of clubs and associations 
(Satyanath, Voigtländer, and Voth 2017). The upper panel plots the residuals in 
the naive regression, simply using a bivariate regression. There is a good deal of 
spatial dependence. Most of the Ruhr area shows positive deviations, meaning 
that there was more voting for the NSDAP than expected; the opposite is true 
in the Eastern part of Germany. The lower panel shows the effect of including 
province fixed effects. Now, both in the Ruhr and in Saxony positive and 
negative deviations at the local level sit side-by-side. As is readily apparent from 
eyeballing the residuals, spatial autocorrelation is well-controlled, with red and 
blue dots (indicating above and below average levels of Nazi support) 




Panel a: Residuals, baseline OLS regression 
 
Panel b: Residuals after using geographical fixed effects and controls 
Figure 4: Spatial correlation in Nazi voting, residuals after baseline OLS 
specification (panel a), or with fixed effects (panel b). Data from Satyanath et al. 
(2017). 
 
Figure 5 shows that most papers included in Kelly (2019) register a marked 
improvement once we use the more sensible, "full" specifications included in 
the original papers. In other words, the majority of researchers working on 
persistence were perfectly aware of the potential problems arising from spatial 
correlation, and already took effective steps to sidestep its impact. In doing so, 
they overcame most of the upward bias in significance; almost no paper suffers 
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from results that become insignificant in the key specification, once spatial 
dependence is properly controlled for. What remains are minor disagreements 




Figure 5: Significance of main parameter estimates, baseline vs full 
specification, OLS vs Kelly (2019) method 
 
Note: The graph shows the statistical significance of the main variable of interest, for two 
estimation methods and two specifications (4 outcomes per paper) – simple OLS and the Kelly 
random noise method, using the baseline specification in the paper and the most demanding 
specification used. Example: In the Becker & Woessmann paper, using the baseline 
specification, spatial noise outperforms the estimated coefficient 56% of the time. In the most 
demanding specification, this is only the case 1% of the time.  
 
There are also major doubts about the conceptual usefulness of Kelly’s approach 
– the percentage of cases where noise outperforms the OLS estimation in 
Figure 5 is not an accurate guide to the validity of the estimation technique. 
Monte Carlo simulations by Colella et al. (2019) demonstrate that his horserace 
of spatial noise regressed on spatial noise is too restrictive, leading to a 
substantial exaggeration of any existing bias. The standard Conley correction of 
standard errors for spatial correlation is sufficient to assess the significance of 
findings. If randomization inference is to be used, it should only be used with 
spatial noise as the exogenous variable – a test which most persistence papers 
pass with flying colors. In other words, most of the problem identified by Kelly 
                                                 
10 The code and data for regressions and simulations in this essay are freely available at 
http://www.jvoth.com/data/replication/handbook and at the ICSPR data repository.  
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(2019) is a myth. His paper overestimates the scale of the problem, creates an 
artificially high bar for overcoming it; it is also not compelling in its insistence 
that persistence papers are particularly prone to suffer from spatial dependence 
to the point of insignificance. 
 
A different potential objection concerns the size of parameter estimates. Casey 
and Klemp (2018) argue that the coefficients in persistence regressions suffer 
from systematic upward bias -- and the more so, the longer the period over a 
which a trait's persistence is being examined. Their argument is simple. If we 
are interested in the effect of A on B. A is changing as time goes by. If A is 
potentially endogenous, we need an instrument to estimate the causal effect of 
A on B. Now, A is often not observed in the past: instead we measure A’,  
contemporaneous values of the variable. Crucially, historical values of A can 
influence modern-day values of A’. Casey and Klemp now argue that the OLS 
coefficient will over-estimate the effect of modern-day A if historical values of 
A’ are not very similar to modern-day ones, i.e. if persistence is low. The 
intuition for this result is that the OLS coefficient indicates the long-run effect 
of an increase in historical A that leads to a unit rise in modern-day A. If 
persistence of A is low, then estimating with IV will systematically overestimate 
the size of effects.  
 
Casey and Klemp make a point that is conceptually valid. At the same time, the 
corrections necessary appear relatively small. They apply their approach to 
deriving correct estimates to the Becker and Woessmann study, for example, 
and find a coefficient that is only 9% smaller than the one estimated by 
conventional IV. For the case of Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) famous study of settler 
mortality, institutions and income, the correction is somewhat larger – reducing 
the main coefficient by 45%. However, conceptual challenges appear a potentially 
greater issue (Albouy 2012).  
 
Conclusions 
Econometric challenges in persistence studies undoubtedly have to be taken 
seriously. In ‘apples-and-oranges’ studies, there is a real risk of p-hacking 
because of the wide range of variables that can appear on the left-hand side of 
an econometric equation. This is especially true when modern-day surveys are 
used to generate dependent variables, since they typcially contain dozens of 
questions. The potential effect of spatial correlation, on the other hand, has 
been exaggerated. The problem of autocorrelated spatial residuals biasing 
standard errors downwards is not specific to persistence studies, and is well-
known. Recent work examining various persistence papers with this problem in 
mind  (Kelly 2019) appears to overstate its severity by several orders of 
 27
magnitude, and offers no diagnostics that are conceptually or empirically 
superior to well-established routines (Colella et al. 2019).  
 
Conclusion: Vanishing for Understanding 
‘My future will not copy fair my past’ 
- Elizabeth Barret-Browning 
 
 
To escape one’s origins, to leave behind the binding ties of family, place, class 
and gender, is a dream as old as mankind – as the Barret-Browning suggests. 
The rapidly growing literature in economics showing a surprising predictive 
power of the past touched a nerve within economics and beyond, because it 
seems to question this dream. Nothing can today be done to change a country’s 
technology, or its government institutions, in 1000 BC; nor can African nations 
exposed to the slave-trade shed their past. One view is that, the tighter the 
handcuffs of the past shackle the present, the more fatalistic – and less hopeful 
– economics as a science will have to be. An alternative interpretation is that a 
deeper understanding of the determinants of riches and poverty can guide 
policy interventions towards more realistic ‘levers of riches’ (Mokyr 1990).11  
 
A significant share of papers claiming to find evidence of persistence regress 
some historical variable on a modern-day outcome. Many are almost entirely 
“black box”, and do not go beyond finding a significant coefficient, or invoking 
vertical transmission from parent to child as a likely interpretation. This may 
make sense when the same trait, preference or attitude is measured historically 
and in modern times --- but this is arguably the case in only a minority of 
papers. As the conceptual distance between the historical and the modern-day 
measure increases, the passing on of culture from parent to child becomes less 
and less likely, and alternative mechanisms become more likely -- such as new 
equilibria driven by an interaction of economic outcomes with historical 
characteristics, or the simple stickiness  of economic geography and man-made 
infrastructure. Many persistence studies invoke culture as an arguably plausible 
mechanism, but it is rare that its role is demonstrated in a rigorous fashion. 
Where complex interactions between historical variables combined to create 
differences in initial outcomes, the further scientific value-added of “reduced 
form” estimates, derived from regressing modern-day outcomes on past 
indicators, is going to be limited. 
 
                                                 
11 A similar point is made by Nunn (2020).  
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As in other areas of empirical work in economics, more work on mechanisms 
will be helpful. To understand persistence of this (more narrow) kind, we 
arguably need to look at what it takes to make it go away. This will allow a 
better understanding of the mechanisms driving it in the first place. An 
ambitious paper that attempts to accomplish this is Giuliano and Nunn (2017). 
They argue that the stability of a group's environment encourages a high degree 
of vertical transmission. In particular, they examine whether areas that 
experienced considerable shifts in climatic conditions are more conservative in 
their attitudes, giving greater weight to the opinions of elders and the like. In 
each generation, people have a choice of either copying from previous 
generations, or of experimenting with new technologies, agricultural practices, 
or forms of interaction. The more stable the environment, the greater the 
similarity of conditions today relative to those of the previous generation. The 
extent of variability then affects the degree of stability of preferences and 
practices. To measure stability of the environment, Giuliano and Nunn (2017) 
look at climatic change over the period 500-1900. Across a range of empirical 
settings, they find support for their basic prediction: In the World Value 
Survey, people from countries with greater climatic variation in the past show 
less regard for tradition. When looking at immigrants to the US, there is also 
less outgroup marriage for those who come from countries where climate 
stayed large the same over the last 1,500 years. Similarly, immigrants from 
countries with stable climates were also less likely to speak English at home 
after migrating to the US. They then go on to examine stability of the same 
traits over time, and the extent to which this is attenuated by climatic 
variability. For three variables -- cousin marriage, polygamy, and female labor 
force participation -- they find a high degree of persistence, as well as an 
attenuating effect of climatic instability. Giuliano and Nunn conclude that 
persistence is an outcome, which can be rationalized based on the costs and 
benefits associated with it.  
 
Along similar lines, Voigtländer and Voth (2012) document that the predictive 
power of medieval anti-Semitism in Germany in general was high for 
persecution in the interwar period. However, persistence is lower in towns and 
cities with a greater immigration in the 19th century. In other words, where 
modern-day inhabitants were largely unrelated to the people living in a location 
centuries ago, persistence – narrowly defined – vanishes. The same is true in 
old trading cities, where there was a particularly strong trade-off between 
prejudice on the one hand, and economic success on the other. Differential 
migration and its effect on the composition in general is arguably 
underappreciated as a driver of cultural change: Ichino and Maggi (2000) 
demonstrate that in Italy, the more reliable employees gravitated towards the 
North, where they would find co-workers with similar characteristics. Similarly, 
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East Germany’s continued underperformance after reunification may echo the 
size of the brain drain prior to 1961 (Sascha O. Becker, Mergele, and 
Woessmann 2020).12 Such findings reconnect with some of the theoretical work 
on the trade-offs involved in cultural transmission – in this case, the canonical 
Bisin-Verdier model of parental investment in childrens’ attitudes (Bisin and 
Verdier 2000; 2001).13 
 
The second meaning of “persistence” highlighted by the Oxford English Dictionary 
is the “fact of continuing in an opinion or course of action in spite of difficulty 
or opposition.” To make progress, persistence studies will have to grapple not 
just with scepticism by professional historians, but to find ways of dealing 
effectively with the challenges highlighted in this essay. In ‘apple-on-apple’ 
analyses, where the same or near-identical variables are on the right- and left-
hand side, and where attitudes, beliefs, cultural preferences or social 
arrangements are often the focus, we can speak of persistence in its basic form. 
Going forward, a greater focus on persistence in this stricter sense of the word 
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